OneWorld.net note: The rescue of high profile hostage Ingrid Betancourt may mark the beginning of the end for Colombia's FARC guerrilla movement, coming just weeks after the death of the group's leader and a series of defeats at the hands of the military, writes a Latin America research group.
Ingrid Betancourt hugs her mother © Radio Netherlands WereldomroepIngrid Betancourt, the former Colombian presidential candidate, had been held hostage by the guerrilla group Las Fuerzas Armadas de Colombia (FARC) for six years. She was rescued Tuesday along with 14 others, including three U.S. citizens. Human Rights Watch is calling on FARC to release the hundreds of other Colombians still being held hostage.
The "bloodless rescue operation" orchestrated by the military has increased confidence in current president Alvaro Uribe, whose anti-guerilla sentiments and free-market policies have gained him U.S. support. Investor confidence in Colombia has also improved since the victory as stocks surged and the local currency rose almost three percent since Wednesday.
Uribe's victory will also redefine the balance of power between Colombia and Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez, who has claimed he was the only one who could safely deliver the hostages from the hands of the FARC. In recent days, Chavez has called on the FARC to abandon its armed struggle.
From: Council On Hemispheric Affairs (COHA)
In recent weeks, COHA has issued a number of communiqués to the
press that have explored various aspects of Colombia’s domestic and
regional policies. This material, in addition to that which is
available on its website, can be obtained by contacting COHA’s office
at or calling ![]()
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202-223-4975.
FARC’s Fatal Blow
In yet another blow to Colombia’s leftist guerrilla group Las Fuerzas
Armadas de Colombia (FARC), former Colombian presidential candidate
Ingrid Betancourt and fourteen other hostages were freed in a brilliant
military operation on 2 July 2008. Betancourt was taken captive six
years ago and was, for the duration of that time, the FARC’s highest
profile hostage. Among the other detainees rescued are three American
defense contractors and members of the Colombian security forces.
According to Colombia’s hardline Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos, whose star is very much in ascendancy in a movie-script fashion, Colombian intelligence forces managed to infiltrate the FARC’s Secretariat and intercept the transfer of key hostages from one area of the country to another. The operation, termed jaque, after the Spanish word “check,” as in “check mate,” was the culmination of a year’s worth of preparation. The rescue of the hostages represents a huge victory for the Uribe government and yet another in a series of crucial defeats for FARC forces. It may also signal the successful impact of the hundreds of millions of dollars that have been pumped annually into the Colombian military by the U.S. under Plan Colombia. Such funds already have been used to persuade hundreds, if not thousands, of FARC fighters to demobilize and certainly provided a strong motivation for the murder of Ivan Ríos (for which his renegade personal bodyguard was rewarded $2.5 million).
FARC’s Precarious Future
With Betancourt’s release, the FARC has lost its highest profile
hostage and now is in a very precarious position for negotiation and
may have to bow to the demands of the Colombian government. Hopefully,
its recent fate will be a clear signal to the FARC that Venezuela’s
Hugo Chávez was correct when, on June 10 of this year, he urged “Enough
of so much war, it is time to sit down and talk of peace. […] The
guerrilla has passed into history.”
Recalling the abrupt decline of Peru’s Shining Path guerrilla movement after the 1992 capture of its leader Abimael Guzman, it is unlikely that FARC will be able to survive in its present form given the natural death of its leader, Manuel Marulanda, and the series of crippling blows it has experienced at the hands of the Colombian army. Undoubtedly, Colombia’s military has been assisted by the CIA and the hundreds of U.S. armed forces advisors and trainers now in the country.
Political Implications
Uribe has benefited immensely from the rapid decline in the FARC’s
vitality and relevance. Only time will tell how Uribe’s military
exploits and his astronomical approval rating will affect the possible
de-legitimization of his 2006 run for office. It will also be
interesting to see if Betancourt, immensely popular during her run for
Senate and the presidency, will present a very strong challenge to the
president if she decides to run for office either in a possible re-run
election or the official elections slated for 2010.
It is true that Uribe’s hawkish democratic security policy has resulted in significant progress for the country. Homicide and kidnapping rates have fallen dramatically and Colombians have resumed many of their ordinary activities without fear of suffering violence caused by the conflict. His popularity is a result of these advances, however, this success may unfortunately lend credibility to those who have supported Uribe’s iron-fist approach and substantive program from the beginning: members of the Bush administration and presumptive Republican nominee John McCain. The danger in attributing Uribe’s accomplishments to U.S. foreign policy achievements in Latin America is that it reaffirms strategies that are overly simplistic and ill-informed. It should not be ignored that upwards of twenty percent of Uribe’s legislature is currently under investigation for its links to paramilitary groups, who are historic human rights violators. Even Uribe himself has been accused of links to the illegally armed groups. Mindless U.S. support of a regime that tacitly allowed such groups to function should not be applauded nor should the hundreds of trade union leaders that have been murdered during the Uribe presidency be forgotten.
Additionally, cocaine’s effect on the trajectory of the conflict cannot be underestimated. In the 2008 World Drug Report, the United Nations reported that coca cultivation in Colombia increased 27% in 2007. Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Shannon attributed these statistics to the growing sophistication of coca cultivators. This is certainly true for many aspects of the conflict. For every bit of progress that the Colombian government makes, various actors will try to stay one step ahead, driven by vast cocaine profits which provide an incredibly strong incentive for the continued destabilization of Colombian institutions. No matter what the ultimate fate of the FARC, it will be quite some time before Colombia can claim victory for the quality or depth of its democracy.
This
analysis was prepared by Research Associates Erina Uozumi, Jessica
Bryant, Elizabeth Reavey, Chris Sweeney, Michael Katz, and Aviva
Elzufon
July 2nd, 2008