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Non-Proliferation at a Crossroads

“In my view, we have come to a fork in the road: either there must be a demonstrated commitment to move towards nuclear disarmament, or we should resign ourselves to the fact that other countries will pursue a more dangerous parity through proliferation.”

Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency 4 Nov. 2004, Stanford University

When the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) entered into force in 1970, there were high hopes for its ability to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Due to the massive destruction that nuclear weapons were capable of causing, it was universally recognized that there needed to be clear limitations on their development and use.

Despite citizen advocacy for complete and/or partial disarmament—at national and global levels—nation states were reluctant to give up the perceived security advantages of sometimes-extensive national arsenals. Ultimately, many saw fashioning arms-control agreements as the most realistic course of action to ensure global security. Such agreements were increasingly pursued over the second half of the 20th century and proved useful in limiting the nuclear arms race.

Global Progress

Although having nuclear weapons of their own, China, France, the United Kingdom, Russia and the United States wanted to ensure that proliferation of these weapons to other countries did not occur. Meanwhile, many countries that were not in this

The 1970 adoption of the NPT offered hope that nuclear disarmament was within reach.

nuclear club were willing to renounce acquiring nuclear weapons, but still wanted the option of using nuclear energy for “peaceful purposes.” A grand bargain was reached during NPT negotiations in the late 1960s in which the nuclear states would share nuclear technology and participate in “good faith” negotiations to achieve nuclear disarmament while non-nuclear states would forgo developing or acquiring these weapons. The adoption of this treaty was considered a key step forward where arms control was concerned, not least because it offered the hope that nuclear disarmament was within reach. In 1995, the treaty was indefinitely extended by a consensus vote of more than 170 countries and, at the last review conference in 2000, 187 states parties agreed upon 13 practical steps that nuclear weapons states would take toward further disarmament. A review of the treaty occurs every five years and the 7th such conference is taking place in New York this month (May 2005).

The NPT helped to establish international legal and ethical norms against the acquisition of nuclear weapons and, as such, made it much harder to justify their use. There have also been other advances in the years since 1970. Global rules and institutions have developed that govern nuclear exports and better account for nuclear materials. Most importantly, there have been reductions in nuclear weapons overall. The numbers of countries that have such weapons, or are conducting weapons-related research, have dropped substantially since the 1960s. Argentina, Brazil, Libya, South Africa, and Ukraine, for example, have renounced nuclear weapons ambitions or programs.

Inherent Weaknesses

In addition to notable successes, the NPT agreement suffers from some inherent weaknesses—one of the main ones being that it is not universal. India, Pakistan, and Israel are not parties to the treaty and North Korea pulled out of the treaty in early 2003. All of these countries are suspected of having nuclear weapons programs. India, for its part, does not support the treaty on the premise that it restricts nuclear weapons to a few countries rather than eliminating them altogether. The discriminatory nature of the NPT—that it offers special privileges to some countries and not others—is often cited as one of its greatest flaws. These double standards inherent in the treaty have caused a significant degree of ill will. The mainstream media often overlooks this key point.

Not surprisingly, countries come to this topic from very different points of view depending on their nuclear status. Those with nuclear weapons, like the U.S., have been primarily concerned about proliferation of these weapons, the non-compliance of certain countries, and the possibilities of nuclear terrorism. Those without these weapons, however, are more concerned about disarmament and have accused the nuclear weapons states of failing to pursue the “good faith” disarmament commitments they pledged under the NPT. A lack of specific time frames for accomplishing disarmament goals has not helped matters.

Nuclear disarmament has in fact occurred—just not as extensively as some have hoped. U.S. State Department documents assert that the U.S. has reduced its nuclear weapons stockpile by more than 13,000 since 1988. Although it is more difficult to get accurate figures from Russia, it is thought that reductions in stockpiles have been at equivalent or higher amounts during this time. In June 2004, the U.S. Energy Department also announced that "almost half" of the warheads in the current U.S. stockpile (over 10,000) would be retired by 2012 and eventually dismantled.

Critics point out, however, that the United States and Russia together still have some 27,000 nuclear weapons, which account for about 95% of the world’s remaining nuclear arsenal. (See link below to global map.) Although thousands of these weapons are in reserve, they can still be rapidly redeployed. As arms control advocates note, taking weapons out of active service, dismantling them, and actually destroying them are all very different things.

Current Challenges

Media and policy attention—especially in the U.S.—has been focused on countries, like Iran and North Korea, that are thought to be manufacturing nuclear weapons under the guise of “peaceful uses” of nuclear technology. These states are under pressure to comply with their side of the NPT bargain, including curtailing uranium enrichment programs. (The ability to enrich uranium and reprocess plutonium is a key factor in nuclear weapons proliferation.)

Enforcing universal compliance with tighter rules to prevent making fuel for atomic weapons is high on the international agenda, as is keeping dangerous fissile materials out of the hands of terrorist networks. The international community agrees that such weapons falling into the hands of extremist groups could lead to a tragedy of enormous proportions.

For these reasons, many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) share Bush Administration concerns that there needs to be stricter verification that other countries are complying with their NPT commitments. UN agencies estimate that some 40 countries now have the knowledge and means to produce nuclear weapons. It is also possible for countries to come very close to having nuclear weapons capabilities without explicitly violating the agreement—and to leave the treaty with no particular sanction.

One interim solution is an increased role for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). An Optional Protocol to the NPT would give the IAEA the right to conduct more intrusive inspections of nuclear activities in all countries. Although robust inspections can be effective, there has not been enough international support to give the IAEA the power and resources it needs to conduct them. (At May 2005 this Protocol had only 65 states parties.) A lack of enforcement to reign in violators of the treaty is another serious matter. NGOs point out, however, that empowering the UN to enforce the treaty and punish violators would mitigate this problem.

Most assume that the May 2005 NPT Review Conference will conclude with a watered-down consensus document, but will not deal with tougher issues. The latter includes the basic discriminations in the treaty, the slow pace of disarmament among nuclear weapons states, and these states’ lack of transparency in disclosing information about their own arsenals. Many arms control advocates have blamed the G.W. Bush Administration for undermining the legitimacy of the NPT regime. They assert that, not only has the current U.S. Administration not lived up to prior NPT commitments, but that it continues to request funding for new weapons programs.

Because the U.S. has unilaterally disavowed many commitments made under the NPT process, there is profound mistrust among other countries that it has any real interest in a rule-based international security system.

Make a Difference: There's a lot you can do to help make the world safe from nuclear weapons. Check out our Get Involved section.

Speak Up: Have your say about the issues discussed here, and find out what others are saying.

Read more: For an overview of the disarmament movement, see “The Work of NGOs.” The “From the Frontlines” section offers views from those working on the issue everyday as well as a plea from an American student to her government.

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