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Costs and Benefits

Given the role of some ruling elites in instigating genocide, an effective strategy to prevent genocide is one that raises the costs and reduces the benefits of genocidal policies. This may be achieved in part by carefully calibrated diplomacy, including the coordinated use of carrots and sticks. Governments can, for example, offer or withhold development assistance,

An effective strategy raises the costs and reduces the benefits of genocidal policies.

impose targeted sanctions, publicly or privately condemn a regime’s behavior, or aid opposition groups. They can also use the threat of judicial accountability for leaders who instigate crimes against humanity. Recent events help make this threat more credible. In late March 2006, for example, former Liberian President Charles Taylor was arrested for his alleged role in crimes committed during a brutal civil war in Sierra Leone and the notorious Congolese rebel leader Thomas Lubanga was delivered to the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

In short, there are plenty of options for governments. The tendency to perceive the military deployment of “boots on the ground” as the only viable tool for humanitarian intervention can often dissuade policy makers from taking intermediate, non-military actions to prevent and mitigate genocidal violence. There are targeted, incremental strategies that can be used to maximum effect—such as the withholding of $1 billion in development and reconstruction assistance to Serbia until it extradited former president Slobodan Milosevic to The Hague in 2001.

Can Genocide Be Stopped?

There are cases, however, when preventive diplomacy may in fact fail and genocide is already underway. In this situation, the rapid deployment of effective peace enforcement is essential to halt and deter continuing violence.

© Organisation des Nations Unies / Igor Vastlev/DPIDiscussions about halting genocide once it is underway often revolve around how to generate “political will” on the part of governments to protect civilian populations. Andrea Bartoli, Director of Columbia University’s Center for International Conflict Resolution, points out, however, that the lack of political will is only part of the problem.

If a house is burning, Bartoli notes, one needs not only the will to put out the fire, but also a “system in place to move enough water to the fire when things are burning.” This system would mean having a fire response system, including a “911” network, emergency dispatchers, trained firefighters, trucks and rescue equipment, municipal water mains, and fire hydrants. Likewise, to prevent genocide, one needs both the will and the capacity for this task, Bartoli adds.

The absence of an integrated system for preventing and responding to genocide contributes to the sense of futility that policy makers often experience when confronted with mass atrocities. By and large, the record of the international community in peacekeeping and peace enforcement over the past half-century has been poor. Typically, the UN and other international organizations have deployed peacekeeping forces belatedly, if at all, with insufficient personnel, equipment, and logistical support, and often with an inadequate mandate to suppress violent attacks on noncombatants. This is the case in the Darfur region of Sudan today, where the African Union monitoring mission has deployed 7,000 troops with minimal equipment and logistical support. This mission has no formal authorization to protect civilians from attacks and patrols a territory the size of France.

Improving the System

The world does not presently have an effective international “fire brigade” to stop genocidal conflicts. Rather, the UN and other international organizations typically wait until after the conflagration has erupted before recruiting an ad hoc volunteer squad to fight the blaze. In lieu of not yet having a working “fire fighting” capacity, what can be done in the meantime?

Some 800 British soldiers in Sierra Leone succeeded in capturing rebel leader Foday Sankoh in 2000 and substantially reduced the level of violence in the country.

Despite the failures, the international community has been able to mitigate conflict in a variety of circumstances. For example, the deployment of 800 British soldiers to Sierra Leone in 2000 succeeded in capturing rebel leader Foday Sankoh and substantially reducing the level of violence in the country. Likewise, the UN preventive deployment to Macedonia of 1995-1998, the West African ECOWAS peacekeeping mission to Liberia in 2003, the 3-month deployment of the French “Artemis” mission to Eastern Congo in 2003, and the continuing presence of a small French and UN force in Cote d’Ivoire have all played a critical role in establishing a measure of stability in regions on the brink of mass atrocities.

These effective missions have been characterized by a clearly defined mandate that is credibly enforced. The key to success is not always in the overall number of troops deployed, but in the presence of at least a small contingent of highly trained and well-equipped troops from industrialized nations who have been willing to utilize armed force in order to execute their mission.

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